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Abstract: As Nigeria’s Central Bank marks its 60th anniversary, it has become necessary to assess its performance. Consequently 
in this paper, we provide a comprehensive, unbiased review of the Central bank of Nigeria (CBN). The paper starts with a 
discussion on the role and activities of the West African Currency Board, which was the precursor of the CBN and subsequently 
analyzes how the Board led to the emergence of the CBN. We look at the functions, mandate and organizational structure of the 
CBN. Second, we assess how the CBN has responded to the changing financial landscape over the years. Third, noting that the 
CBN has over time promoted financial reforms and played a key regulatory role, we discuss the sufficiency of the financial reforms 
it has promoted as well as the regulatory tools that it has deployed over the years. In this regard, we specifically highlight the role 
of the CBN in the global financial crises of 2007-2009 as well as the European debt crises of 2010 to 2013. Fourth, given that the 
primary mandate of the CBN revolves around price and exchange rate stability, we analyze its performance thus far noting the 
numerous challenges it has faced. Summarily, we find that the CBN has operated a multi-pronged approach by utilizing a 
combination of policy instruments including price-based, quantity-based and administrative policy measures. Going forward, we 
recommend that the CBN needs to continue to adopt avant garde mechanisms to further strengthen the Nigerian banking industry 
with a view to maintaining the stability and health of the economy.   
Keywords: Central Bank of Nigeria, financial reforms, policy measures. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
With Nigeria‟s prominent position as the biggest economy 
in Africa (Knoema, 2018), economists and foreign investors 
have become increasingly interested in understanding the 
nature of the Nigerian financial system and the way in which 
financial system regulators and supervisors administer the 
financial landscape. More specifically, international observers 
are interested in how the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
administers the monetary policy as well as banking system 
regulation. The Nigerian financial system consists of financial 
instruments, financial markets, financial intermediaries, 
operators, rules, conventions and norms that facilitate the 
flow of funds through the macro-economy. The system is 
controlled through government agencies such as the CBN.  
This paper is an exploratory attempt on the development 
of central banking in Nigeria, its operations at different 
episodes of Nigeria‟s national development as well as its 
future outlook. The paper is divided into six sections. The 
first section introduces the paper. The second section reviews 
the currency board system that predated the establishment of 
the CBN. The third section reviews the role of the CBN at 
different episodes of national development. The fourth 
section discusses the mandate and organization of the CBN. 
The fifth section highlights the main functions of the CBN 
and an attempt is made at performance 
evaluation/assessment. The sixth section concludes.    
2. THE WEST AFRICAN CURRENCY BOARD 
During the period in which the four British West 
African territories were under colonial rule, the West African 
Currency Board (WACB) was the colonial monetary 
authority. The WACB, established in 1912 and 
headquartered in London, had a constitution that charged it 
“to provide for and to control the supply of currency to the 
British West African Colonies, Protectorates and Trust 
Territories.” (Uche, 1997a:220). In practice however, the 
Board was no more than a Bureau de Change issuing as 
much local currency as the banks wanted to buy for sterling 
and vice versa. It was therefore not, in the technical sense, a 
monetary authority. During the period from 1912 to 1960, 
the common currency for the British West African colonies 
was the West African pound currency note which exchanged 
at par with the British pound at the rate 1:1. Such a system, 
however, satisfied the monetary policy objective of the Bank 
of England in achieving price stability in the colonies as well 
as enormous seigniorage profits. The price stability policy 
was also compatible with British commercial interests in the 
colony as it helped facilitate trade with London. The colonial 
banks that oiled the trade mechanism also profited from the 
system (Uche, 1997a, Uche 2009). 
Price stability and parity conversions however had their cost: 
the ability of the WACB to create credit was severely 
hampered. This pre-central banking system also perpetuated 
a situation where large parts of the Nigerian Government 
funds were held abroad. This situation further constrained 
liquidity availability for indigenous development. Access to 
credit was indeed what the Africans, rightly or wrongly, 
believed that they needed most if they were to gain political 
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independence and so dispensing with the WACB in favor of 
a Central Bank was considered an integral part of throwing 
off the economic shackles of colonialism. Political factors 
were also at work in accelerating the change process as noted 
by Sayers but quoted by Uche (1997a: 221): 
“Colonial territories seeking some measure of political 
independence have tended to regard a Central Bank as an 
outward and visible sign of independence and the lack of one 
as signifying a continued subjection.” And further stated 
that, “In fact, the WACB system was generally seen, by 
Africans as ‘the financial hallmark of colonialism.‟” 
Origins of the WACB System 
In the aftermath of the scramble and partition of West Africa, 
Britain having secured proper control of its colonies decided 
to put in place an economic and political system for the 
smooth functioning of the territories. The colonial 
government, in an attempt to make British coins more 
prominent, then went on to de-monetize certain coins that 
were in circulation. By 1880, for example, formal legislation 
had been established in the Lagos colony which provided for 
the demonetization of certain coins. The new regulation 
recognized only British gold and silver coins and a few 
foreign gold coins as legal tender (Uche, 2009). 
The resultant rise in the use of British coins was, however, 
not without its problems: Such coins had to be transported 
from London to the West African coast and then carried 
inland. The cost of this transfer was not only the transport 
costs; there were also interest charges building up in London 
even while the coins were in transit and also during slack 
trading periods when the coins were stored locally in safes. 
The preference of the Africans for silver coins did not help 
matters either as this necessitated the regular reordering of 
the coin stock for the colony. The above situation, coupled 
with the need to service the British commercial interests then 
in existence, created the opportunity for the establishment of 
a bank. This opportunity was first identified in 1871 when 
the Bank of West Africa was incorporated in London under 
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1862 and 1867. The bank, 
whose head office was located in London, was to have its 
first two branches located in Sierra Leone and Lagos. There 
is, however, no evidence that this bank ever opened for 
business. It was not until 1891 that another bank - the 
African Banking Corporation (ABC) - capitalized on this 
opportunity by opening a branch in Lagos. This marked the 
advent of both commercial banking and expatriate banks into 
British West Africa. The ABC, which at the time was 
headquartered in London and had operations in South Africa, 
came to Nigeria at the instance of Elder Dempster Company 
which was in control of the shipping business on the West 
African coast and therefore heavily involved in the 
importation of British coins into the colony. 
The ABC immediately took advantage of the disorderly 
system of currency supply to the West African territories. By 
28 January 1892, it signed an agreement with the Crown 
Agents by which the Bank was given the right to import new 
silver coins from the mint into Lagos Colony – free of 
charges for packing, freight and insurance. By May 1892, the 
Bank further consolidated its position by becoming banker to 
the colonial government in Lagos. The close relationship 
between the bank and the Elder Dempster Company soon 
became the subject of protests by other European merchants 
in the territory. Such protests, among other factors, caused 
ABC to develop second thoughts about its Nigerian 
investment.   
In 1893, the ABC invited the Elder Dempster Co. to take 
over its Lagos operations to which the latter obliged and 
instantly lost its preferential treatment over silver 
importation. The Governor of Lagos was soon instructed to 
close the official account with the bank. The reason given 
was that the colonial government wanted such functions to 
be carried out by a public bank and not a trading company 
like Elder Dempster. Perhaps, because of the initial protests 
received, the colonial government also required that such an 
institution should be absolutely independent and restricted 
from engaging in any business other than that of banking.   
To get around this problem, a „public‟ bank named Bank of 
British West Africa (BBWA), with Alfred Jones as majority 
shareholder, was established in May 1894(Uche, 2009). It 
subsequently established offices in Accra (1898), Freetown 
(1898) and Bathurst (1902). Soon after, the „new‟ bank 
entered into an agreement with the Crown Agents of the 
Colonies under which the duties and responsibilities of 
controlling and regulating the silver currency in Lagos were 
transferred from the government to the bank. This new 
agreement was slightly different from the one which the 
government had with the African Banking Corporation in 
that it conferred on the bank (BBWA) the sole right of silver 
importation. The BBWA subsequently consolidated its 
position in British West Africa by entering into similar 
agreements with the governments of the Gold Coast colony 
(1896), Sierra Leone (1898) and the Gambia (1902). 
BBWA enjoyed silver importation monopoly until 1912 
when a special silver currency was introduced for the West 
African colony. This, in itself, was mainly a consequence of 
the disagreements between the colonial governors and Her 
Majesty‟s Treasury over the control, sharing and nature of 
the seigniorage arising from the importation of silver into the 
British West African colonies. The BBWA had no influence 
in the establishment of a special silver currency for the 
colony. If anything, it opposed such a currency. The West 
African Currency Board (WACB) was subsequently set up 
bringing to an end the BBWA‟s monopoly over silver 
imports into the territory. The WACB was headquartered in 
London and required agents for its operations within the 
West African colonies; the BBWA became its obvious ally. 
The BBWA secured the agency of the currency board in 
West Africa. In this capacity, it continued to deal with the 
movement of British money in West Africa, though relieved 
of control over the supply of it from the mint. The BBWA 
thus continued to be relevant under the currency board 
dispensation. Earlier in 1899, the BBWA had lost its 
monopoly position in the Nigerian colony with the advent of 
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the Bank of Nigeria. However, it retained its monopoly in 
the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia (Uche, 2009). 
Moreover, by the time the Niger Coast Protectorate came 
into existence in 1893, there was already in place a 
community of powerful European traders in the territory 
(Pakenham, 1991). These European traders seeking to 
maintain their tight grip on the market had come up with a 
working agreement for the purpose of stifling competition. 
Their plan was simple- keep costs low; maximize profits and 
ensure that a uniform amounts were paid for whatever 
commodities they purchased. To forestall the BBWA from 
gaining a foothold in their territory, they set up the Anglo-
African Bank in 1899 and made a strong bid for the job of 
importing silver into the colony and for the banking business 
of the colonial government. The Colonial office obviously 
knew that this bank would be of little assistance in the task 
of establishing the British currency in the colony; this was 
due to the fact that the companies behind the Anglo African 
Bank believed that the maintenance of the barter system best 
served their interests. Such an attitude was against the 
interest of the Colonial Government which was pro-
monetization. Monetization, it was believed, would make 
governance and the lives of government employees easier. 
The Colonial Government eventually persuaded BBWA to 
open a branch in the South. This directive was resisted and 
there was aggressive protest by the European merchants 
against the activities of the BBWA and associated 
companies. Specifically, in May 1908, there was a petition 
done to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of 
Crewe, to end the monopoly of the BBWA over silver 
importation. With the protests came moves for the two 
competing banks (BBWA and the Bank of Nigeria- 
established in 1899) to merge. From 1906, Alfred Jones 
interested in the merger, made several attempts albeit 
unsuccessfully. It was not until 1912, three years after the 
death of Alfred Jones that the Bank of Nigeria was finally 
absorbed by the BBWA (Uche, 1997).  
The opposition of the Colonial Government to the Bank of 
Nigeria showed that the interest of the Colonial Government 
did not always coincide with those of colonial banks. The 
Colonial Government, sometimes through the WACB, was 
at the time interested in using the commercial banks as a tool 
for advancing its monetization agenda. The British trading 
interests that set up the Bank of Nigeria, however, perceived 
this as being against their interest. Each party subsequently 
adopted its own strategy in order to achieve its aim. In other 
words, the relationship between the banks and the monetary 
authority was such that each tried to influence the other. The 
opposition of the BBWA to the issuance of a special silver 
currency for the region was another point of divergence 
between the Colonial Office and the colonial banks. 
It is also possible to argue that the interests of the BBWA 
and the WACB were similar. This was true only to the extent 
that monetization and currency distribution agency suited 
both parties. Cracks in their relationship would have 
emerged had the WACB pursued policies that upset the 
stable macroeconomic environment under which the bank 
operated. The Colonial government would also have reacted 
had the BBWA adopted policies and/or pursued activities 
that infringed on their interests. In fact, the BBWA did not 
always agree with the colonial government and monetary 
authorities as evidenced by the decision of the Colonial 
government in 1916 to break the monopoly BBWA enjoyed 
in the region with the introduction of the Colonial Bank. By 
1919, the Colonial government had decided on an equal 
division of the silver currency distribution agency between 
the two banks. This was endorsed by the Colonial office 
despite the protests by the BBWA. Stiff competition soon 
gave way to an agreement between the two banks. The first 
such agreement occurred in May 1924. This grew in 
comprehension over the years. It was thus not surprising 
that, as the collusion among foreign banks grew, the idea of 
indigenous banks to service the needs of Africans became 
pronounced.  
The foregoing discussion on the relationship between the 
WACB and the Colonial banks provides a meaningful 
narrative with the relationship between the Central Bank of 
Nigeria in the post-independence era and the various 
commercial banks in the country. The discussion further 
helps to understand the underlying politics in the regulation 
of banks by the Central Bank in different phases of the 
financial system or economic development thus providing a 
fresh perspective on the forces that shape banking regulation 
in the post-independence era. 
Role of Banks in the Demise of the Currency Board 
System 
Nigeria was the only country among the pre-independence 
British West African colonies that established an indigenous 
banking system alongside the colonial banking system. The 
first indigenous bank in Nigeria – The Industrial and 
Commercial Bank (1929-1930) – failed mainly due to 
mismanagement, accounting incompetence, embezzlement 
and the non-cooperative attitude and denigration of colonial 
banks (Newlyn & Rowan, 1954). Despite this setback, 
further attempts were made and by 1947, six additional 
indigenous banks had been established out of which two had 
failed. The colonial government, foreseeing that further bank 
failures were imminent, moved to regulate the industry. In 
1948, Mr. G.D. Paton submitted his now famous report 
recommending banking regulation in Nigeria which 
culminated in the 1952 Banking Ordinance.  
Preceding the enactment of the 1952 Banking Ordinance, 
Nigerians, fearing the imminent clampdown on the 
establishment of commercial banks following the setting up 
of the Paton inquiry, had rushed to establish more banks 
before the advent of regulation. The result was that by 1952 
at least 24 local banks had been established thus 
precipitating a crisis in the Nigerian banking system. It was 
evident that the majority of these indigenous banks were 
bound to fail, especially with the advent of regulation. It was 
against this background that a motion was moved in the 
Federal House of Representatives for the immediate 
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establishment of a central bank, one of its main aims being to 
strengthen the existing local banks. In other words, Nigerians 
saw a central bank as a vehicle for assisting their 
beleaguered commercial banks. Also entwined with this 
event was the belief by the Africans that a central bank 
would make it easier for them to access credit, which would 
help power the much needed development. Such views 
sometimes stemmed from a misconception of central 
banking (Uche, 1997a; Uche, 2009). Also, the WACB was 
commonly viewed as the “financial hallmark of 
colonialism.” Dismantling it was therefore a legitimate part 
of the de-colonization process. Foreign banks were 
uncomfortable with such views. Such banks were registered 
in London and therefore fell under the regulatory jurisdiction 
of London. Policies that involved taking orders from 
indigenous African governments, with respect to their 
operations, could not be accepted with joy. The WACB 
system, which exerted little influence on their operations, 
therefore suited their interests best. Also, the monopoly of 
the two chief banks of the distribution of the government‟s 
silver currency was bound to be lost with the introduction of 
a central bank. Furthermore, the Bank of England was 
against allowing the establishment of central banks in 
underdeveloped economies. The Bank believed that without 
developed political structures, political interference with the 
activities of such central banks would be of little use in 
territories with underdeveloped money markets. 
Furthermore, developmental functions were at the time 
considered, at least in colonial government circles, to be 
outside the scope of central banking.  
As earlier mentioned, foreign banks were not the only 
beneficiaries of the WACB system. The colonial government 
that established it also earned seigniorage profits from the 
system. The motion for a central bank with lender of last 
resort function, not surprisingly, did not please the Financial 
Secretary appointed by the colonial government, who argued 
that Nigeria at „its stage of development‟ was better served 
by a currency board than a central bank. He was nevertheless 
prepared, perhaps due to the immense support the motion 
received from the African parliamentarians, „to reconsider 
the matter‟. This culminated in the revision of the motion to 
exclude assistance to indigenous banks. In essence, the 
colonial government did not consider it important that such a 
central bank, if established, should concern itself with 
developmental functions like assisting in the strengthening 
of the indigenous African banks. J. L. Fisher of the Bank of 
England was subsequently invited to examine the matter. He 
advised against the establishment of a central bank in the 
(Nigerian) colony. The demand for a central bank gained 
momentum following the report of the commission 
appointed by the International bank for reconstruction and 
development IBRD known as the International Bank 
mission. The mission was the first non Nigerian body to 
demand the immediate establishment of a central bank.  
Still the federal government did not implement the 
recommendations of the International Bank Mission but 
rather set up another committee- the J.B. Loyne‟s committee. 
It was the report of this committee that paved the way for the 
establishment of Nigeria‟s central bank.  Among other 
reasons, the commission noted the need for the establishment 
of an indigenous federal institution that would perform 
central banking functions.  
In 1958 following Loyne‟s recommendations, the Central 
bank of Nigeria was established. The Central Bank of Ghana 
preceded that of Nigeria, having been established in 1957. 
Sierra Leone and Gambia‟s came into existence in 1963 and 
1971 respectively.  
Table 1: Chronology of Events That Led to the 
Establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Year Event(s) 
1948 The Colonial Government appointed Mr. G.D. 
Paton to investigate the Nigerian banking 
environment and stipulate conditions for 
healthy banking development. The resulting 
G.D. Paton‟s report of 1948 recommended the 
introduction of banking regulation.  
1951/52 Nigerians rush to establish indigenous banks 
before the introduction of regulation. At least 
17 such banks were established. 
1952 The Nigerian Banking Ordinance was 
promulgated. 
1952 Africans call for a Central Bank which, among 
other things, will help salvage the indigenous 
banks. 
1953 J. L. Fisher, of the Bank of England, advised 
against the establishment of a Nigerian Central 
Bank. 
1954 16 indigenous banks failed.  
1954 An IBRD mission to Nigeria recommended the 
early establishment of a Central Bank with 
limited functions. 
1956 J. B. Loynes, of the Bank of England, 
appointed to advice on the type of central bank 
to be established.  
1958 The Central Bank of Nigeria established with 
Roy Pentelow Fenton, of the Bank of England, 
as its first Governor. 
 Source: Uche (1997a:222). 
 
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 
(CBN) 
The dissatisfaction of Africans with the colonial commercial 
banking system was a major reason for the transition from 
the currency board system to central banking. This led to the 
establishment of poorly capitalized, poorly managed and 
poorly staffed indigenous commercial banks. The collapse of 
most of these indigenous banks led to calls for a lender of 
last resort – a central bank – to help save them. Such rescue 
operations were seen by the Bank of England as beyond the 
scope of an infant central bank, if established. The Bank of 
England also had doubts about the ability of a central bank, 
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run by Africans, to resist political interference in monetary 
policy management. From previous experience of the 20th 
century interwar years, the Bank of England knew that 
political interference in the activities of central banks was a 
direct path to uncontrolled inflation.  
The Role of the CBN in its Early Years (1958-1972) 
The CBN started operations on 1st July 1959 and by April of 
1960 had issued its first Treasury Bills. In May 1961, the 
central bank launched the Lagos Bankers Clearing House 
which provided licensed banks a framework in which to 
exchange and clear cheques seamlessly. By July 1, 1961, the 
central bank had completed issuing all denominations of new 
Nigerian notes and coins and completely redeemed all of the 
West African Currency Board‟s previous money. 
Specifically, the CBN continued to administer the Banking 
Act of 1958 until 1962 when there were significant 
amendments made to the said Act with the following 
important provisions: 
The minimum share capital of banks was reviewed upwards: 
indigenous banks £250,000, foreign banks £250,000. 
Existing banks were given a seven-year grace period to 
comply with the new capital regulation. (This grace period 
was commendable when compared to the three-year period 
of the 1952 Banking Ordinance) 
In addition, foreign banks were required to give  undertaking 
to the Ministry of Finance to retain in Nigeria funds equal to 
the minimum capital £250,000. Other aspects covered by the 
new Act included new regulations on bank liquidity which 
now re- defined the composition of liquid assets. With 
respect to the acquisition of assets, banks were now allowed 
to own real estate for the purpose of future development. The 
Act did not make any specific pronouncements regarding the 
management or corporate governance of these banks. 
Just as the seven years grace period for banks was about to 
expire in 1969, a new Banking decree repealing the 1958 
Banking Act was promulgated by the Military administration 
of General Yakubu Gowon.  Specifically, the minimum paid-
up capital of banks was reviewed upwards from £250,000 to 
£300,000 for indigenous banks. Foreign banks were required 
to beef up capital to £750,000. Furthermore, banks were 
required to be incorporated in Nigeria following the 
provisions outlined in the Companies Act 1968 and banks 
were specifically to publish only the financial statements of 
their Nigerian operations. Indeed the Central Bank of Nigeria 
was further strengthened by this new decree and its powers 
extended to the monitoring and approval of bank adverts. 
The opening and closing of bank branches could now be 
done only with the due authorization of the CBN. This new 
clause on opening of new branches was understandable, 
given that a major factor behind the failure of a number of 
banks in the 1953-54 banking crisis were in fact attributed to 
the ambitious branch openings of indigenous banks (Uche, 
1997). Also limits were imposed on interest rates and bank 
lending to the private sector.  
In addition to the existing requirement for banks to transfer 
25 percent of their net profit into a reserve fund until the 
total sum was equal to the paid-up capital, this Decree 
further required that a transfer of 12.5 percent of net profit be 
made where the amount of reserve funds was equal to, or in 
excess of, paid-up share capital. The CBN was thus 
strengthened to exercise its powers in maintaining monetary 
stability within the economy.  
The end result of these capital increases was the exit of 
private indigenous banks from the Nigerian banking pitch. 
By 1969, all the indigenous banks that survived the 1953/54 
banking crisis had been taken over by regional/state 
governments. This was because the share capital increases 
had made indigenous participation in bank ownership 
difficult (Ogowewo & Uche, 2006). 
As Uzoaga (1986) noted: 
 “The cumulative effect of the successive increase [sic] in 
minimum capital requirements has been the socialization of 
the most promising private indigenous banks as well as the 
erection of thorny barriers against effective participation of 
private indigenous companies in the banking business. Only 
two groups can now afford to meet easily the stringent 
capital requirements to operate banks in Nigeria. These are 
the expatriate banking companies and the statutory or state 
sponsored agencies.‟‟ 
The CBN was also instrumental to the establishment of the 
Capital Market regulatory body – the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) – when, in 1962, it laid a 
foundation for capital market regulation through the 
establishment of the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) that 
was charged with the mandate to regulate the public issues of 
securities. The CIC‟s mandate was to examine applications 
from companies seeking to raise capital from the market and 
to recommend the timing of such issues. The CIC, however, 
had no legal backing but operated unofficially as a capital 
market consultative and advisory body within the CBN. The 
CIC metamorphosed into a Capital Issues Commission in 
March 1973. It was not until the Indigenization era of the 
1970s, which boosted market activities, that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established by the 
SEC Act 1979. The establishment of SEC followed the 
recommendations of the Financial System Review 
Committee led by Dr. Pius Okigbo in 1976. 
In sum, during the first one and a half decade of existence of 
the CBN, preceding the indigenization era, foreign investors 
were free to set up businesses and manage these businesses 
themselves or in partnership with the Nigerian State or 
Federal Government or indigenous Nigerian businessmen. 
Investment activities took place in the country with the 
ownership largely concentrated in the hands of foreign 
investors which resulted in huge repatriation of funds abroad 
(Teriba, Edozien & Kayode, 1981). To curb this repatriation 
of funds, the Federal Government promulgated the Nigerian 
Enterprise Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972 which was 
amended in 1977. During this pre-indigenization era, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria continued its role as banker to the 
Federal Government, administering the monetary policy and 
banking supervision.  
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The CBN Regulatory Role during the Indigenization Era 
(1972-1986) 
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 which 
was promulgated in Nigeria, twelve years after the country 
gained (political) independence from British colonial rule, 
put in place a framework for the varied transfer of equity 
ownership of expatriate businesses to Nigerians. The Decree 
was replaced by a more stringent order in 1977 (Mohammed, 
1985, Uche, 2012, Obasi, 2015). 
The objectives of the indigenisation Decrees were derived 
from the Development Plans of 1970/74 which conceived 
indigenisation as a logical continuation of the 
“Nigerianisation” pursuit of the post Independence period. 
The NEPD launched in 1972 to fulfil the second Plan's 
objectives had the following objectives: the creation of 
opportunities for indigenous businessmen; the maximisation 
of local retention of profits, through a reorganisation of the 
ownership structure of the economy in favour of domestic 
capital; and the raising of the level of industrial intermediate 
capital goods production. The last was to be achieved by 
compelling the alien business community to move into more 
capital-intensive and more technologically advanced 
production, particularly in manufacturing. 
The three stated objectives were also central to the 1977 
NEP Decree. Brigadier Shehu Yar‟ Adua, Chief of Staff, 
Supreme Headquarters, stated in 1976 that the "objectives 
for the first phase of the indigenisation exercise still remain 
valid for the second phase…” The second NEP Decree 
perfected the indigenisation plan and so there were changes 
in a few areas such as in the number of businesses covered 
by the decree as well as the level of ownership stipulated. 
Having increased the number of enterprises under Schedules 
I and II, the 1977 NEP Decree also covered all unaffected 
enterprises under a third Schedule. However, Nigerian 
ownership under the new Schedule III was limited to 40%. 
In Schedule II, 60% of shares were to become Nigerian, and 
40% foreign. A striking difference between the two Decrees 
is the addition of what government spokesmen called an 
"egalitarian" objective to the 1977 Decree (Mohammed, 
1985). 
Dr. A. Adedeji, the former Federal Commissioner of 
Economic Planning, and one of the chief architects of the 
1972 Decree, opined that "the primary purpose of 
indigenisation is economic decolonisation, the reduction of 
economic dependence and the achievement of an increasing 
measure of self-reliance through internally located and self-
sustaining growth. Once we define indigenisation in this 
way, we have to relate our analysis of the problem to its 
political base." Arguably, nobody is better placed to describe 
the objectives of indigenisation in Nigeria than the much 
respected Dr. A. Adedeji. He argued that the economic 
motives of indigenisation were pre-eminent and yet also 
acknowledged that political factors must play an important 
part in the formation and execution of the NEPDs. The 
configuration of economic forces in the country and the 
private and sectional pressures on government had clearly 
significantly influenced post-colonial administration in 
Nigeria in the direction of greater indigenisation. Nigeria's 
method of achieving the very "economic autonomy" which 
was supposed to complement political independence were 
evident in the government's pursuit of the indigenisation 
programme. 
In order to articulate the overall intentions of indigenisation, 
in a widely reported speech, General Y. Gowon, then Head 
of State, during a state visit to Britain in 1973 provided an 
official summary of the perceived essence of the 1972 
indigenisation Decree. He argued that the government was 
consolidating political independence by doing all that it 
could to provide more participation by Nigerians in 
economic life while attracting more investment in sectors of 
the economy where Nigerians are not yet able to rely on 
themselves. The same arguments for indigenisation were 
presented by one of his successors, General O. Obasanjo, in 
a speech to members of the National Institute of Policy and 
Strategic Studies in Jos on 3rd September 1979. 
He reiterated that "meaningful development and 
transformation of our society can only be achieved through 
self-reliant and self-sustaining economic programmes and 
policies…the idea of a self-reliant and self-sufficient nation 
is something which must be pursued." The NEPD came to 
form the policy instrument for the realisation of those 
pursuits - namely "economic independence", political 
stability and social progress at large. In all the interviews 
conducted, and discussions held with government officials, 
including Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Board (NEPB) and 
Council (NEPC) staff in the course of Mohammed‟s (1985) 
study of indigenisation, one question on which there was 
unanimity from respondents was on the original officially 
declared aim of the NEPD - namely economic independence 
(Mohammed, 1985). 
Moreover, a strong economy controlled by the indigenous 
business sector, was seen as a cornerstone of domestic 
political stability and in addition, as a necessary condition 
for a stronger voice in international diplomacy. The 
realization of socio-economic prosperity and political 
stability are supposed to be helped by the redistribution of 
wealth from foreigners to Nigerians. The denunciation by a 
few radical intellectuals who claimed that the „strangle hold‟ 
by the foreigners was exploitative was not a true reason for 
the indigenization decree. Rather it was the elite perceptions 
that it was dangerous to permit external parties maintain 
economic domination of the country.  Thus from the 1970s, 
government acquired controlling shares in a number of 
foreign banks, including the “big three” commercial banks 
which dominated the Nigerian banking space, with the 
objective to “directly influence their lending policies to the 
maximum benefit of the economy.” The motivation for the 
Federal Government equity participation in banking was the 
urgent need to control strategic industries (or what was 
popularly referred to as the commanding heights of the 
economy) and to further the indigenization policy that it was 
pursuing (Ajayi & Ojo, 2006; Uche, 2012). The policy of 
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Government in banks in which it held equity was to appoint 
board members including the Chairman and to set out broad 
policy guidelines for their operations, while the daily 
running was left with banks‟ management.  
While the Exchange Control Act of 1962 did not deal with 
banks directly, banks were however affected as the 
transactions were carried out through the banking system. 
The existing foreign exchange restrictions would necessarily 
affect the activities of banks. Nevertheless, the arrangement 
of government equity participation in banks explains the 
relative stability that reigned in the banking system up until 
the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
in 1986. During this Pre-SAP era which was characterized 
by intensive regulation and government ownership of banks, 
the government was unwilling to let any of its banks fail 
irrespective of the bank‟s financial condition or quality of 
management. Government feared the potential adverse 
effects on confidence in the banking system and in the 
economy following a bank failure. Consequently, 
government deliberately propped up a number of inefficient 
banks, thus implicitly protecting the shareholders. The 
stability however was accompanied with some „private 
costs‟ in the form of substantial bad debts that resulted from 
lending to government and preferred sectors as well as a high 
incidence of Insider loans. In the subsequent phase (SAP 
era), government focus shifted from shareholders‟ protection 
(by averting bank failure) to protection of depositors through 
the establishment of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. 
Specifically, it has been argued that the foundation of 
another phase of banking distress was laid during the 
Indigenization era (Paseda, 2012). It has been severally 
argued that the balance sheet structure of banks (maturity 
mismatching of assets and liabilities and the non-
marketability of some assets) render them particularly 
vulnerable to inflation. In the words of Merton Miller, 
banking is a 19th century disaster-prone technology. It is 
thus, in the interest of such banks to lobby for the 
enforcement of policies that will counter inflation which was 
caused by government fiscal recklessness. The huge 
government reserves accumulated from the oil boom at that 
time fuelled fiscal indiscipline. Indigenization therefore 
greatly weakened the ability of the banking sector to protect 
itself. Government ownership of the banks ensured that 
when it came to the inflation debate, government was simply 
talking to itself. It simply became difficult to distinguish 
between views of government and views of the banks. This 
was further complicated by the fact that the small size of the 
Nigerian financial system relative to the GDP effectively 
reduced banks‟ clout with respect to influencing government 
policies. Until fiscal recklessness is checked, the use of 
monetary policies alone to achieve macroeconomic stability 
will remain nothing more than an illusion. Thus, under this 
scenario and even in a democratic setting, any talk about 
central banking independence will be of little consequence 
on price stability (Uche, 1997b). This argument became 
quite obvious with the distress that later plagued the banking 
industry during the SAP and Post-SAP periods. 
A rural banking scheme was launched in July 1977 with the 
decision to allocate banks to identified rural areas on the 
basis of a formula which related the number of each bank‟s 
rural branches to its total branch network throughout the 
country. The purpose was to mobilize rural savings and 
channel them to rural development. Specifically, banks were 
required to establish over 760 rural branches over a period of 
10 years. The sole aim was to mobilize the financial 
resources of the rural areas, promote banking habit, attract 
cash held in the rural areas to the banking system in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy and extend 
credit to the rural areas. The CBN offered a number of 
incentives to encourage rural bank establishment, including 
waiving feasibility study for rural branches, excluding rural 
bank credits from total loans and advances (e.g. for purpose 
of prudential loan-to-deposit limits), granting a reasonable 
monopoly period in a rural branches location to enable a 
bank build up sizeable number of branches in the same 
locality; and allowing a 5 percent (from April 1980) 
investment allowance in excess of what is normally 
allowable in industrial companies (normal initial 15% and 
annual 10% allowed by banks as industrial enterprises). Due 
to the large number of rural communities in need of banking 
services, it was decided to phase the programme for ease of 
execution and control. The first phase of the programme 
spanned July 1977 to June 1980 (three years) with 200 
“rural” branches allocated to 19 commercial banks to 
establish. By June 1980, 188 branches (or 94 percent) of the 
initial 200 branches were opened. The shortfall was lumped 
into the second phase and opened during the period. The 
second phase spanned another period of four years from 
1980 to 1984. 229 branches out of the planned 266 branches 
were actually opened. 19 additional branches were opened in 
1985 while the CBN continued to exert pressures on the 
banks concerned to establish the remaining 18 branches so 
that by 1988, a total of 258 branches had been established 
under the second phase leaving 8 outstanding. The third 
phase of the programme (August 1985- July 1989) witnessed 
the opening of 293 branches out of a 300-branch plan. 
However, problems such as infrastructural deficits, poverty 
levels and illiteracy contributed to the low volume of rural 
business to cover banking overheads. Again the 
nationalization of major banks heightened focus on 
compliance with the allocative policy on lending in 
accordance with the Banking Decree of 1969. Thus, direct 
control measures such as sectoral credit guidelines and 
interest rate controls were used by the Central Bank to 
influence allocation of resources to the public and preferred 
sectors of the economy, notably agriculture and 
manufacturing.  
In addition, interest rates in real terms were generally 
negative leading to low savings, misdirected lending and low 
growth. The era was characterized by poor service culture, 
low level of technology utilization for accounting and 
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operations, and made banking halls the most unwelcome 
places to visit as long queues and the use of “tally numbers” 
were commonplace. It was the era of “sellers‟ market” 
characterized by armchair banking. 
CBN Role during the Structural Adjustment 
Programme/ Deregulation Era (1986-1993) 
In 1986, the Babangida Administration, under pressure from 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
launched the Structural Adjustment Programme. The sharp 
fall in oil revenues in the early 1980s, accumulated trade 
arrears and increased debt service burden had precipitated an 
economic crisis which also reinforced the need to liberalize 
the economy from government controls. SAP was therefore 
introduced and designed to achieve balance of payment 
viability by altering and restructuring the production and 
consumption patterns of the economy, eliminating price 
distortions (to improve efficiency of resource allocation), 
reducing the heavy dependence on consumer goods imports 
and crude oil exports, enhancing the nonoil export base, 
rationalizing the role of the public sector, accelerating the 
growth potential of the private sector and achieving 
sustainable growth. To achieve the stated objectives, the 
main strategies of the programme were the adoption of a 
market-determined exchange rate for the Naira (N), the 
deregulation of external trade and payments arrangements, 
reductions in price and administrative controls and more 
reliance on market forces as a major determinant of 
economic activity. 
An integral part of this programme was the deregulation of 
the banking system. Bank licensing policy was liberalized 
thereby giving rise to a proliferation of banks and other 
financial institutions. For instance, during the period 1985-
1992, the number of licensed commercial and merchant 
banks increased from 40 to 120. Most of these new banks 
were no more than money changers (Bureau de Change). 
The deregulation of the economy, loopholes and sometimes 
outright evasion of the law made it possible for some of the 
banks to survive and prosper by mainly trading foreign 
exchange.      
Other policy thrust during the SAP era included: 
 Deregulation of interest rate regime 
 Establishment of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) 
 Promulgation of the CBN Act 1991 and Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) 1991 
(Decree numbers 24 and 25 respectively); 
 Introduction of Open Market Operations 
From the onset of SAP, the deregulation of interest rates was 
accepted as an important element of the reform process. 
Early in 1987, the interest rate structure was adjusted 
upwards. This policy was taken as a means of improving the 
efficiency of the banking system and improving resource 
allocation. The principle of maintaining a minimum level of 
interest rate on savings and time deposits and a maximum 
lending rate was retained. The controls on interest rates were 
removed in 1987 and the CBN adopted the policy of fixing 
only its minimum rediscount rate. This was to signal the 
CBN‟s desired direction of interest rate changes. Another 
major interest rate policy that was taken was in 1989 when 
the CBN announced that banks could pay interest on current 
account deposits while the rate to be paid would be 
negotiable between banks and their customers. Subsequently, 
the payment of interest on demand deposits was made 
mandatory for banks in January 1990. The purpose of this 
was to enhance greater competition in the mobilization of 
savings.  
Two major changes to interest rates occurred before 1992. 
The first was the issuance of guidelines by the CBN on the 
spread of banks‟ interest rates. This affected the spreads 
between savings deposit and prime lending rates, the prime 
and the highest lending rates and the margin between inter-
bank interest rates and prime lending rates. The second 
modification was in January 1991 when the government, as a 
temporary measure had to prescribe a maximum margin 
between the banks‟ average cost of funds and their 
maximum lending rates as well as a minimum level of 
savings deposit rates. The resultant high interest rates were 
suspected to inhibit investment and hence growth, thus 
counterproductive. In 1992, the policy of interest rate 
deregulation was reinstated as a result of the orderliness that 
has been restored to the interest rate regime. The reforms in 
the financial sector were designed to increase competition, 
and strengthen the supervisory role of the regulatory 
authorities. 
The proliferation of banks that followed financial 
liberalization brought about mixed blessings. While the 
increased number of banks brought about keen competition 
with all the different innovations, it also overstretched the 
limited number of qualified people in the industry. Some 
banks resorted to poaching in an attempt to get the necessary 
manpower for the management of their banks. As a result of 
the increasing demand for high-level manpower, given the 
limited supply, standards were compromised. As a result of 
the compromise of standards together with other defects such 
as rampant internal mismanagement, insider abuse, massive 
loan repayment defaults and macroeconomic instability, 
there was systemic distress in the banking sector in the Post-
SAP era (between 1995 and 2000). Indeed a total of 33 
terminally distressed banks had their licenses revoked 
between 1994 and 2000 - 2 in 1994, 2 in 1995, 26 in 1998 
and 3 in 2000. 
The deregulation of the economy created both risks and 
opportunities for the banks and there was increased 
competition not just amongst banks but also with non-bank 
financial institutions such as finance houses which were also 
a creation of deregulation.  SAP therefore fundamentally 
changed the structure of banking in the Nigerian economy. 
The new spirit of competition meant that the decision as to 
whether banks failed or not was to be determined by market 
forces. Government therefore focused on protecting the 
depositors, hence the establishment of the NDIC in March 
1989. Government guarantee of deposits, although limited, 
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also necessitated closer prudential monitoring of the 
activities of the insured banks. Prudential Guidelines were 
released to ensure proper credit classification and income 
recognition, as part of the measures to promote the financial 
health of banks. The Prudential Guidelines attempted to 
align banking regulations with international best practices. 
For instance, the capital adequacy requirements were 
introduced in accordance with the Basel Accord and rules on 
classification of/ provisions for loan exposures and off-
balance sheet commitments were based on International 
Accounting Standards. The profits declared by most banks 
shrunk as a result of this prudential regime and their 
financial condition could have been much worse had they 
not been allowed to spread the required provisions over a 
period of four years. For example, First Bank of Nigeria 
made a loss after tax of N205.4m in 1990 compared to a 
profit after tax of N106m reported for the previous year 
(Ajekigbe, 2009). In addition, Government‟s directive that 
back-log of naira deposits for foreign exchange applications 
yet to be approved and all public-sector deposits be 
transferred to the CBN, to curb rising inflation, also 
triggered a liquidity crisis in the financial system. 
With the promulgation of the CBN Decree No 24 of 1991 
and the BOFI Decree No 25 of 1991, the independence of 
the CBN was strengthened and its capacity to supervise both 
banks and non-bank financial institutions was enshrined in 
the legal framework. Prior to that period, one of the 
problems that plagued the Nigerian financial system was the 
inadequate legal framework for the effective regulation and 
supervision of both banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. In addition, the repealed CBN Act of 1958 and 
the Banking Act of 1969 were not only inadequate but were 
also riddled with ambiguities. The new CBN Decree 
however, made it possible for the Central Bank to report 
directly to the President instead of the bureaucracy fraught 
with the previous method of reporting through the Ministry 
of Finance.  Furthermore, 
 The CBN acquired the powers to compile and 
circulate to all banks in Nigeria, a list of bank 
debtors whose debts to any bank had been classified 
by bank examiners (S. 52). 
 The BOFID vested the CBN with the sole licensing 
power for both banks and non-bank financial 
institutions (S. 2, 3, 56 and 57). This, therefore, 
brought the activities of primary mortgage 
institutions, discount and finance houses, etc. under 
the regulatory ambit of the CBN. 
 The CBN was vested with the powers to deal with 
any failing (or ailing) bank and failed bank. For 
instance, the CBN, with the approval of the 
President, can assume control and management of a 
failing bank (S.34) and apply to a court either to 
purchase a failing bank for a nominal fee, for the 
purpose of restructuring it or liquidating it (S.36). 
 To enhance the CBN‟s newly granted 
administrative enforcement powers, the Decrees 
overflow with provisions imposing high monetary 
penalties ranging from N5,000 to N1m as well as 
imprisonment terms ranging from one to ten years. 
The NDIC at the time endorsed the provisions of 
the Decrees.  
 Further, the practice of government equity participation in 
banks, as under the indigenization era, came to an end 
between 1992 and 1993 when the Federal Government 
divested most of its equity holdings in banks to Nigerian 
private investors. The reforms also led to the emergence of 
privately-owned banks that introduced online banking 
services and automation of banking processes, which 
reduced queues in banking halls. They also provided 
incentives for banks to innovate, offer new products and run 
efficiently. In effect, the structure of banking was 
dramatically altered with the emergence of „new generation‟ 
banks who contested for the existing banking market space 
with their „old generation‟ counterparts. The new generation 
banks thrived with their unique value proposition, to 
corporate, high net worth individuals, high-income 
professionals, which was hinged on efficient services and 
higher interest rates on deposits following the deregulation 
of interest rates in 1987. 
Unfortunately, the proliferation of banks heightened abuses 
in the foreign exchange market as banks sought to take 
advantage of arbitraging opportunities which existed 
between exchange rates at the official and parallel markets. 
Most of these banks were no more than Bureau de Changes 
(Uche, 2000). Also, the phenomenal growth in the number of 
banks overstretched CBN‟s regulatory capacity while the 
growing sophistication in the design and use of financial 
instruments heightened credit and operational risks. 
The desired reallocation of credit from the public to the 
private sector did not occur because of the Federal 
Government huge spending that resulted in ever-increasing 
budget deficits after 1987. Thus, government domestic 
borrowing ballooned which was undermined the CBN‟s 
ability to perform effectively some of its statutory functions. 
Huge government borrowing, therefore, crowded out the 
private sector from the credit markets although the problems 
afflicting the real sector and the arbitraging opportunities in 
the foreign exchange market also made granting of credit 
unattractive to most banks. 
One of the main objectives of the CBN is the promotion of 
monetary stability and sound financial system in Nigeria. 
The Government, however, has a considerable say in the 
appointment of Directors and management of the CBN. For 
instance, the Governor, Deputy Governors and Directors of 
the CBN are appointed by the President (S. 9 and 11 of CBN 
Decree 1991). Also the Decree only requires that the CBN 
shall use its best endeavour to maintain external reserves at 
levels considered by the Bank to be appropriate for the 
monetary system of Nigeria (S. 25). Doubtless, these 
provisions give enormous leeway for the Federal 
Government to influence central banking policies, especially 
with respect to financing government activities. This was 
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one of the reasons why the British colonial government was 
reluctant to allow the establishment of a central bank in 
Nigeria. It was to prevent such political interference that the 
British colonial government ensured that the 1958 CBN 
Ordinance which they midwifed contained a clause 
specifically stating that: 
'The value of the reserve. . . shall- (a) for a period of five 
years. . . be not less than the aggregate of an amount 
representing sixty per cent- of the Bank's notes and coins in 
circulation together with an amount representing thirty-five 
per cent of the Bank's other demand liabilities; (b) after five 
years.. . be not less than forty per cent of the aggregate of the 
Bank's notes and coins in circulation and other demand 
liabilities' (s.26).  
The 1991 Decree, however, contained provisions that if 
adhered to will assist in the attainment of the policy 
objective of monetary stability. For instance, section 33 
asserts that: 
'The Bank may grant temporary advances to the Federal 
Government in respect of' temporary deficiency of budget 
revenue at such rate of interest as the Bank may determine. . 
. The total amount of such advances outstanding shall not at 
anytime exceed twelve and a half per cent of the estimated 
recurrent budget revenue of the Federal Government for the 
year in which the advances are granted. . . All advances 
made pursuant to this section shall be repaid as soon as 
possible and shall in any event be repayable by the end of the 
Federal Government financial year in which they are granted 
and if such advances remain unpaid at the end of the year, 
the power of the Bank to grant such further advances in any 
subsequent year shall not be exercisable, unless and until the 
outstanding advances have been repaid'. 
Unfortunately, this important provision is rarely heeded and 
the CBN has continued to finance government fiscal deficits 
without any inhibitions, advancing more than 50 percent of 
the budgeted revenue in some years. Pius Okigbo, in his yet 
to be published report, argued that on no account should the 
Governor either break or be allowed to break the law. His 
report therefore proposed that the breach of this provision is 
a sufficient condition for the removal of the CBN Governor. 
But will such a provision help? Not necessarily. A 
government that flouts one law can easily flout another. In 
other words, the problem is not necessarily with the law but 
with its implementation (Uche, 2000). The challenge was 
heightened because Nigeria was at that time under military 
rule where the necessary checks and balances that normally 
characterize government process were practically non-
existent. Such a government was unlikely to adhere to such a 
stringent monetary policy requirement unless there was an 
incentive to do so. Since the government did not derive its 
powers from the electoral box, electoral considerations were 
of little importance. Focus might have been on policies that 
kept the military happy, such as preventing an insurrection 
within its rank and file. This was Nigeria‟s experience under 
16 years of unbroken military rule from 1983-1999.  
Apart from the electorate, another constituency that could 
have supported anti-inflationary pressures/policies were the 
banks. It has been argued that the balance sheet structure of 
banks (maturity mismatching of assets and liabilities and 
non-marketability of some assets) render them particularly 
vulnerable to inflation. It is thus, in the interest of such 
institutions, to lobby for the enforcement of policies that will 
help in the attainment of the monetary policy objective of 
price stability. As had already been mentioned, government 
fiscal indiscipline was one of the main causes of the banking 
crisis in the deregulation and post-SAP era. Unfortunately, 
Nigerian banks were unable to constitute an effective anti-
inflation lobby group because they were largely government 
owned until the divestment of government holdings in the 
early 1990s. Thus, as earlier mentioned, a side-effect of the 
indigenization decree of the 1970s was that it destroyed the 
ability of banks to serve as a check against government fiscal 
indiscipline which causes inflation. The Indigenization 
decree greatly weakened the ability of the banking industry 
to protect its interests. Therefore, the strengthening of this 
potentially important group will therefore be critical in any 
attempt to enable the CBN to carry out its legitimate role 
fearlessly. A robust financial system will represent a strong 
constituency for low inflation which can side with the CBN 
should it choose to obey the law and disobey the 
government. In this regard, the divestment of government 
equity participation in banks during the later-SAP era was a 
welcome development.  
SAP also demanded a change in strategy for training and 
recruiting regulators. What the programme did was to infuse 
entrepreneurial ingenuity into the various segments of the 
Nigerian economy. Entrepreneurs pushed against the 
boundaries of existing laws. In fact, in some cases, their 
operations lie outside the law. Bureaucracy, however, did not 
always allow the government (regulators) to rewrite the laws 
in order to keep pace with the activities of such 
entrepreneurs. Also, under a market economy, it is easy to 
accuse such governments of floating regulations that stifle 
competition. For instance, government found it difficult to 
restrict banks from collusion to manipulate the foreign 
exchange market. This was especially so given the imperfect 
nature of the Nigerian economy. Any interference with the 
market in form of regulatory controls could tamper with the 
long-term workability of such markets. Another aspect of the 
problem was the fact that SAP extensively promoted 
competition among employers with respect to wages. Partly 
because of bureaucracy, regulators' wages – regulators‟ are 
usually employed by the government - almost always lagged 
behind those of private entrepreneurs. Again, partly because 
of bureaucracy, the regulators were slower at adapting and 
responding to technologically changes. The result was that 
the regulators had inferior credentials and expertise 
compared to those being regulated. Under such a 
circumstance, it became easy for the regulator to be 
compromised or outwitted by the „regulatees‟.  
The Guided Deregulation Era (1994-1998) 
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As earlier noted, despite the promulgation of the CBN 
Decree and BOFI Decree both of 1991 and the extensive 
powers granted the CBN and the NDIC, banking stability 
was still threatened.  This period was characterized by lots of 
policy reversals following the change in government and 
perhaps a fatigue from SAP-induced reforms. The political 
instability, unpredictable policy changes and rising inflation 
resulted in capital flight and massive withdrawal of funds by 
depositors.  
The macro-economic policy reversal through the 1994 fiscal 
budget worsened the already weak position of banks. By 
1994/1995, 50 percent of the banks were distressed and ratio 
of the aggregate non-performing loans to total loans ratio 
stood at 43 percent. To salvage the situation, the CBN and 
NDIC adopted measures, including provision of liquidity 
support via accommodation facilities, imposition of holding 
action against further lending, takeover, restructuring and 
liquidation of terminally distressed banks. 
The official and market rates, which were merged under the 
Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) in January 
1989, were separated through a policy of “guided 
deregulation” of the foreign exchange market in 1995. The 
foreign exchange market was segmented into two: official, 
which accommodated government transactions at a special 
rate of N22 to US$1 and the Autonomous Foreign Exchange 
Market (AFEM) for all other users at a rate of N80 to US$1. 
This segmentation created incentives for “rent-seeking”, 
round tripping and other market abuses. 
As the need to attract and retain (foreign) capital within the 
Nigerian economy heightened, it became imperative to relax 
market restriction on foreign equity participation. Thus, the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 7 of 1995 and 
the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) 
Decree No. 16 of 1995 were promulgated. These abolished 
all restrictions on foreign shareholding and guaranteed 
unconditional transferability of dividends, profits, loan 
repayments, interests and remittance of divestiture proceeds. 
The immediate effect of these reforms was a capital market 
boom as the number of listed securities increased together 
with other market indices such as overall capitalization, 
activity levels and relative size of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) with other African Stock Exchanges. Thus, 
during this period, the NSE came under the searchlight of the 
Standards and Poor‟s Emerging Markets.     
Another notable highlight of this period was the reform of 
the national payment system, following the incorporation of 
the Nigerian Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS) and the 
introduction of card-based payment system in 1993. Further 
to this, the Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) 
technology for clearing cheques and the revised clearing 
rules became operational in 1995. Quite important too, the 
required capital base for both commercial and merchant 
banks was raised to N500 million in 1997. Prior to that time, 
Merchant banks and commercial banks were required to 
maintain a minimum capital base of N40m and N50m 
respectively as per BOFI Decree 1991. 
The Universal Banking Era (1999-2001) 
With the return of civilian rule in May 1999, there was an 
apparent return to the path of economic reforms again. 
Universal banking was adopted in January 2000 in response 
to unprecedented pressure from merchant banks clamoring 
for equity - a level playing field due to their disadvantaged 
position especially with regards to the cost of funds. The 
adoption of universal banking, though, has been argued as 
being merely a legal attempt to legislate existing practices. 
Prior to that period, some commercial banks owned 
subsidiaries that were merchant banks. Generally, many 
banks had subsidiaries providing investment banking 
services, capital market, pension, insurance, registrar-ship 
and other related financial services. 
Consequently, the functional delineation between 
commercial and merchant banking, brought about by the 
Banking Decree 1969 was effectively removed thus paving 
the way for uniform licenses to be issued to all banks and for 
them to determine in which segment of the financial services 
market to operate. 
The Small and Medium Enterprises Equity Investment 
Scheme, under which banks set aside 10% of their annual 
profits for equity investment in Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) was set up in August 2001. This 
initiative was followed by the establishment of the Bank of 
Industry Limited (BOI) in October 2001 following the 
reconstruction of the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank 
(NIDB), in keeping with Federal Government‟s intent to use 
SMEs as instruments for rapid industrialization, sustainable 
economic development, poverty alleviation and employment 
generation. In addition, it was during this era that a minimum 
capital base of N1billion was required for all banks. 
In the five years to 2004, the CBN intensified its supervisory 
role over banks while making concerted efforts to shut down 
arbitrage windows in the foreign exchange markets. As part 
of this process, CBN suspended 21 banks for contravening 
foreign exchange regulations in 2002 and also introduced the 
Dutch Auction System (DAS). In addition, the CBN 
undertook an internal reform programme tagged Project 
EAGLE, which was designed to improve its regulatory 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
Table 2 below provides data that allows a comparative 
analysis of the pre-consolidation era. The top four Nigerian 
banks are presented vis-à-vis big African banks operating in 
the Africa. From the table, the ratio of the combined capital 
of Nigerian top 4 banks to that of their African mega 
counterpart was a mere 8.3 percent. This implies that 
Nigerian banks were only marginal players on the African 
continent.         
 Table 2: Capitalization of top 4 Nigerian banks pre-
consolidation (2003) 
 AFRICA‟S 
TOP 4 
CAPITAL 
USD $‟m 
NIGERIA‟S 
TOP 4 
CAPITAL 
USD $‟m 
1 Standard 
Bank 
2,971 Union Bank 269 
2 First Rand 1,851 First Bank 201 
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3 ABSA 1,715 UBA 117 
4 NedBank 1,680 Zenith Bank 99 
 Sub-Total 8,217 Sub-Total 686 
Source: Ajekigbe (2009:24) 
The Consolidation Era (2004 – 2008) 
In his address to the Special Meeting of the Bankers 
Committee on July 6, 2004, the CBN Governor, Professor 
Charles Soludo, announced a 13-point Reform Agenda 
tagged “the New Agenda for Repositioning the CBN and the 
Financial System for the 21st Century”, and outlined as 
follows: 
1. Requirement that the minimum capitalization for 
banks should be N25billion 
 Full compliance before end-December 2005 (18-
month expiry period) 
 Only banks that meet the requirement can hold 
public sector deposits and participate in the DAS by 
end 2005 
 Names of banks that qualify by 31st December 2005 
will be published 
2. Phased withdrawal of public sector funds from 
banks, starting in July 2004. 
3. Consolidation of banking institutions through 
mergers and acquisitions 
4. Adoption of a risk-focused and rule-based 
regulatory framework 
5. Adoption of zero-tolerance in the regulatory 
framework, especially in the area of 
data/information rendition/reporting. 
 Bank MDs to sign all bank returns 
henceforth 
 Manipulation of accounts/ concealment of 
unsavoury transactions off-balance sheet 
will henceforth attract serious sanctions 
6. Automation of rendition of returns by banks and 
other financial institutions 
7. Establishment of a hotline, confidential internet 
address (governor@cenbank.org) for all Nigerians 
wishing to share any confidential information with 
the Governor of the Central Bank on the operations 
of any bank or the financial system. 
 Only the Governor has access to this 
address 
8. Strict enforcement of the contingency planning 
framework for systemic banking distress 
9. Establishment of an Asset Management Company 
as an important element of distress resolution 
10. Promotion of the enforcement of dormant laws 
relating to, for instance, issuance of dud cheques, 
vicarious liabilities of the Board members of banks 
in cases of failings by the bank. 
11. Revision and updating of relevant laws, and 
drafting of new ones relating to the effective 
operations of the banking system. 
12. Closer collaboration with the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in the 
establishment of the Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU), and the enforcement of the anti-money 
laundering and other economic crimes measures. 
13. Single obligor limit of 10% of shareholders‟ funds 
as opposed to the present 25%, with aggregate 
borrowing pegged at 800% of shareholders‟ funds. 
The objective of the reform programme was to create a 
diversified, strong and reliable banking sector, which would 
(i) ensure the safety of depositors‟ money (ii) play active 
developmental roles in the economy, and (iii.) become 
competent and competitive players both in the African and 
global financial systems. 
The direct impact of the reform programme was shrinkage in 
the number of banks from 89 to 25. Only 76 out of 89 banks 
made it given the deadline of December 31st 2005. 76 banks 
either went through some form of merger or acquisition with 
the exception of a few banks that stood alone. 
At the launching of the re-capitalization idea, a lot of 
criticisms grew from the practitioners and academics alike. 
Some observers felt the exercise was targeted at eliminating 
the small banks and reducing the number of banks in the 
country. Job security was further threatened by perceived 
reduction in number or elimination of small banks. Further, 
the exercise was criticized as an attempt to (mis)use share 
capitalization to force the emergence of mega banks whose 
constituents might be “strange bed-fellows”. A policy of 
forced consolidation has its downsides. In fact, consolidation 
– as has been noted by the Central Bank in its „„Code of 
corporate governance for banks in Nigeria post 
consolidation‟‟– poses the following grave governance risks: 
technical incompetence of the board and management; board 
squabbles due to the meshing of different corporate cultures; 
disputes between management and staff; increased levels of 
risks; ineffective integration of entities; poor integration and 
development of information technology, accounting and 
record systems; inadequate management capacity; 
resurgence of a high level of malpractices; insider-related 
lending; rendition of false returns; continued concealment; 
ineffective audit committees; inadequate operational and 
financial controls; absence of a robust risk management 
system; disposal of surplus assets to boost profits so as to 
cover operational losses and inefficiencies; and a lack of 
transparency. It was, therefore, difficult to applaud this 
policy on the grounds that its tangential effect would be to 
improve corporate governance. Furthermore, it was not 
evident that an increase in the share capital of Nigerian 
banks will automatically provoke any significant attitudinal 
change. 
Further, a policy of „„forced consolidation‟‟ is not risk free. 
It increases the likelihood that value destroying 
consolidations may have been consummated. Mergers and 
acquisitions are in the best of circumstances – when they are 
entered into because of the identification of a strategic 
business objective – fraught with many difficulties. Where 
the strategic objective is regulatory pressure, the odds 
against successful consolidations increase. By „„forcing‟‟ 
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banks to approach mergers with an eye to achieving a 
balance sheet consolidation, rather than on the synergies to 
be created, the Central Bank increased the risk that ill-fitting 
entities may have consolidated their balance sheets. 
Consolidated entities that ended up destroying shareholder 
value could hardly be regarded as successful mergers 
(Ogowewo & Uche, 2006). For instance, the experience with 
Spring Bank after consolidation, until its eventual acquisition 
by the CBN, provides strong support for these arguments.  
In fact, the collapse of many alliances (formalized in 
Memoranda of Understanding) during the exercise indicated 
that many value-destroying consolidations were in fact 
avoided; this in no way does not eliminate the point that 
some value-destroying consolidations were implemented. 
Ogowewo & Uche (2006) argued that the risk of shareholder 
value destruction was heightened in the case of banks which 
met the minimum capitalization figure, not through a 
capitalization of reserves, but instead through an issue of 
fresh shares. For such banks, the challenge of maintaining 
their pre-consolidation earnings per share post-consolidation 
will be formidable, since there will now be more shares in 
issue. Furthermore, there will be post-merger integration 
challenges to grapple with. Contrary to the thinking of the 
Central Bank, as evident from its May 2006 circular to 
banks, the harmony of new partners cannot be decreed by 
fiat. Interestingly, the Central Bank did not need to use the 
increase in bank share capital to goad banks towards 
mergers. Before the announcement of the 25 billion share 
capital requirement, developments in the Nigerian banking 
arena showed that the industry was ripe for consolidations. 
Following the announcement of the minimum share capital 
requirement of 2 billion in 2004, applications for new 
banking licenses had all but disappeared. Furthermore, at the 
end of 2003, there were about a dozen or so banks that were 
clear candidates for restructuring. There was, therefore, 
ample room for consolidation to occur in the Nigerian 
banking sector. The important thing to bear in mind is that 
absent regulatory pressure, the consolidations would have 
been strategic and the risk of value destroying consolidations 
will have been reduced. A policy of encouraging strategic 
consolidations, whilst intellectually tasking, is superior to a 
policy of „„forced‟‟ consolidations.   
As expected, banks became awash with liquidity and thus an 
increased appetite to be global players. This era marked 
massive overseas expansion of Nigerian banks. Access 
Bank, for instance, has subsidiaries in Cote D‟Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone and Zambia while Zenith Bank has subsidiaries in 
Sierra Leone and Ghana. The magnitude and speed of 
Nigerian banking investments abroad was such that as at 
September 23, 2008, ten out of 24 Nigerian banks had full-
fledged licensed bank in a foreign country. The banks were 
First Bank, Union Bank, Intercontinental Bank, Access 
Bank, Bank PHB, United Bank for Africa (UBA), Guaranty 
Trust Bank, Zenith Bank and Oceanic Bank. The last to 
make the list is FinBank, formerly First Inland Bank, which 
announced on September 22, presence in the Gambia 
through the acquisition of the Arab Gambian Islamic Bank. 
Further, banks approached the capital market between 2007 
and 2008 to raise equity funds with some banks securing 
foreign listing in developed capital market. For instance, it 
was during this period that Guaranty Trust Bank secured its 
quotation on the London Stock Exchange.  
Table 3 below shows some industry statistics during the 
period 1986-2017. It is worth mentioning that despite the 
reduction in the number of banks from 41 to 25, three key 
performance indicators have improved viz: branch network 
(market penetration), total assets (scale) and credit to the 
private sector (financial intermediation). The figures shown 
are however, nominal.  
Table 3: Some Banking Industry Statistics (1986- 2017) 
Year Number 
of Banks 
Number 
of 
Branches 
Total 
Assets 
(N‟B) 
Credit to 
private 
sector 
(N‟B) 
1986 41 1,394 48.1 17.4 
1987 50 1,516 62.1 25.5 
1988 66 1,711 75.2 29.8 
1989 81 1,909 86.7 30.9 
1990 107 2,013 110.4 36.6 
1991 119 2,107 155.5 45.3 
1992 120 2,391 201.3 80.0 
1993 120 2,382 279.9 95.5 
1994 116 2,547 357.5 151.0 
1995 115 2,512 465.1 211.4 
1996 115 2,554 548.8 221.8 
1997 115 2,477 694.9 275.0 
1998 89 2,220 821.2 351.8 
1999 89 2,344 1,196.0 455.2 
2000 89 2,306 1,707.1 596.0 
2001 90 2,306 2,247.0 855.0 
2002 90 3,123 2,766.9 955.8 
2003 90 3,247 3,047.9 1,301.6 
2004 89 3,247 3,392.9 1,534.4 
2005 89 3,357 4,389.3 2,007.4 
2006 25 3,233 6,738.0 2,565.8 
2007 24 4,200 10,431.0 5,056.7 
2008 24 4,952 14,825.4 7,341.1 
2009 24 5,436 17,522.86 9,667.88 
2010 24 5,809 17,331.56 9,198.17 
2011 24 5,454 19,396.63 9,614.45 
2012 21 5,564 21,303.95 10,443.45 
2013 24 5,639 24,468.37 11,592.08 
2014 24 5,526 27,690.11 13,266.16 
2015 25 5,470 28,369.03 13,658.89 
2016 25 5,570 32,130.45 16,683.89 
2017* 25 5,630  15,830.00 
 Source: Central Bank of Nigeria. Total Assets and Credit to 
Private Sector are in N‟ Billions 2017* figures refer to 
September 2017 (Quarter 3). 
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Table 4 below presents information on the top Nigerian four 
banks as at the end of 2007 vis-à-vis the African mega 
banks. The ratio of their combined capital (of the four 
Nigerian banks) to the combined capital of the African mega 
banks has increased from 8.3 percent as seen in Table 2 to 
39.8 percent in Table 4. 
TABLE 4: Capitalization of Top 4 Nigerian Banks After 
Consolidation (2007) 
 AFRICA‟S 
TOP 4 
CAPITAL 
USD $‟m 
NIGERIA‟S 
TOP 4 
CAPITAL 
USD $‟m 
1 Standard 
Bank 
8,015 Union Bank 3,040 
2 First Rand 5,169 First Bank 2,500 
3 ABSA 5,089 UBA 1,696 
4 NedBank 4,080 Zenith Bank 1,650 
 Sub-Total 22,353 Sub-Total 8,886 
Source: Ajekigbe (2009:24) 
The „new‟ N25 billion capitalization requirement for banks 
by the CBN, despite its numerous flaws, could well have 
turned out to have some unintended positive consequences. 
Mega banks will no doubt be in a much stronger position to 
make the point that Government‟s reckless fiscal policy and 
its attendant macroeconomic instability is the main cause of 
financial instability. Until the fiscal recklessness of the 
Government is checked, the use of monetary policies to 
achieve macroeconomic stability will remain nothing more 
than an illusion. 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 – 2009 and European 
Debt Crisis of 2010-2013 (Restructuring Era) 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 brought to the fore 
the debate as to whether the entire African financial system 
architecture and regulation should be re-designed. During the 
consolidation era, Nigerian banks became awash with 
liquidity to finance big-ticket transactions. In fact, some of 
the banks established branches and subsidiaries in other 
African countries. As at September 2008, 10 out of the 24 
licensed Nigerian banks owned at least a full-fledged 
licensed bank in a foreign country. The banks were First 
Bank of Nigeria, FBN; Union Bank of Nigeria, UBN; 
Intercontinental Bank; Access Bank; Platinum Habib Bank; 
United Bank for Africa, UBA; Guaranty Trust Bank, 
GTBank; Zenith Bank; Oceanic Bank and FinBank. Several 
possible hypotheses rationalize the burst in cross-border 
investments of these banks but the proximate ones include: 
the capital-abundance hypothesis (arising immediately from 
recapitalization), the specific-advantage hypothesis (in terms 
of technological advantage and entrepreneurial excess 
capacity), the ‘multinational fad’ or ‘bandwagon effect’ 
hypothesis and the lower overheads hypothesis. The 
implication of such cross border investments was the 
heightened risk of financial contagion and thus the need to 
develop a robust regional framework for the regulation of 
these multinational African banks in order to contain a 
potential financial shock.   
The ensuing global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, 
however, strained the gains that had been achieved during 
the consolidation era in the financial sector. The immediate 
impact of the global financial turbulence on the Nigerian 
financial system, particularly the banking system, mirrored 
global trends but was largely contained because of limited 
integration with the global financial system. While offshore 
funding of the domestic banking system was growing before 
the crisis, its scale was manageable and the Central Bank 
was able to accommodate commercial banks‟ foreign 
exchange needs in the depth of the global crisis.  
Coupled with major internal management problems in some 
of the banks, the crisis impacted the economy indirectly 
through the following channels viz: significant decline in oil 
revenue leading to revenue attrition for all tiers of 
government; reduced capital inflows into the economy; 
significant drawdown on foreign reserves; demand pressure 
in the foreign exchange market; substantial decline in stock 
market capitalization and share prices with many banks 
trading below their book values; huge bank losses on margin 
loans and share-based facilities as well as loans to the 
downstream oil and gas sector; declining asset values and 
credit squeeze.  
CBN intervention included: 
1) Replacing the Chief Executives and Executive 
Directors of the banks identified as source of 
industry instability; 
2) Injection of the sum of Six hundred and twenty 
billion naira (N620 billion) into the banks in an 
effort to prevent a systemic banking crisis. The 
injection of this fund into these banks then was 
considered sufficient to resolve and stabilize them 
to enable them continue normal business operations, 
with arrangements made to recover non-performing 
loans from the banks‟ debtors while guaranteeing 
all foreign credits and correspondent banking 
commitments.  
3) Commencement of the process for creating an Asset 
Management Company (AMC), as an important 
vehicle for dealing with Non-Performing Loans of 
the banks. Asset Management Corporation of 
Nigeria (AMCON) was established to soak in the 
toxic assets of the CBN-intervened banks and 
provide liquidity to them while facilitating their 
eventual recapitalization. The total toxic assets that 
were absorbed by AMCON during the period 
(2009-2015) were estimated at N5.7 trillion. 
4) Stabilizing the banking system and, indeed, the 
financial system and restore public confidence, the 
CBN also focused attention on ensuring that the 
financial system, in general, began to serve the 
needs of the Nigerian economy in order to 
strengthen the economy through the following: 
(i) Provision of long-term funds at affordable 
interest rates to drive industrial activities 
and infrastructural developments in the 
country, having identified low industrial 
basis and huge infrastructural deficit as 
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binding constraints on achieving Nigeria‟s 
economic development objectives. Such 
funds included the N300bn Power, 
Infrastructure and Aviation fund, N200bn 
RRF for banks‟ existing loan portfolios to 
manufacturing and small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs). 
(ii) N200bn Credit Guarantee Scheme for 
SMEs. 
(iii) N200bn Commercial Agricultural Fund for 
the agricultural sector. 
(iv) N150bn fund to manufacturers through the 
Bank of Industry (BOI) and deposit money 
banks (DMBs). 
(v) Collaboration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE), and the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) to reduce the transaction 
costs particularly bond issues so as to 
diversify funding sources away from banks 
as well as attract more long-term foreign 
investors into the sector.  
5) Strengthened the regulatory and supervisory 
framework through: 
(i) Implementing zero tolerance on all 
unprofessional and unethical banking 
practices 
(ii) Greater emphasis on the enforcement of 
Code of Corporate Governance for banks 
(iii) Stand-by team of examiners for swift 
regulatory responses to distress signals 
(iv) Establishment of the Consumer and 
Financial Protection Division (CFPD) to 
provide a platform through which 
customers could seek redress and directive 
was given to banks to establish Customer 
Help Desks at their head offices and 
branches. 
(v) Enshrinement of customer-friendly Guide 
to Bank Charges. 
(vi) Consumer education and enlightenment 
and CFPD also collaborated with the 
Consumer Protection Council on the 
review of the Consumer Protection Act 
No. 66 of 1992 to enforce discipline in the 
market.  
6) Financial Reporting and Disclosure (through IFRS 
Adoption) in order to enhance market discipline and 
reduce uncertainties which limit the risk of 
unwarranted contagion. 
7) Modification to the Universal Banking (UB) model 
of 2001. The ensuing abuses following 
consolidation and unbridled risk appetite 
compounded with conflict of interests led to 
significant capital losses as banks undertook 
unnecessary speculation, provisions and bets on 
asset prices. 
To address the obvious challenges, the CBN reviewed the 
Universal Banking model with a view to steering the banks 
towards core banking businesses. Under the new model, 
banks were no longer allowed to invest in non-bank 
subsidiaries while banks which, hitherto, had such 
investments were required to either divest or spin-off the 
businesses to holding companies that were licensed by the 
CBN as other financial institutions. The argument posed in 
support of this move was to discontinue the incentives of 
banks to use depositors‟ funds for insurance, stock broking, 
and other non-banking activities. This is in fact the main 
thrust of the banking system restructuring.  
8) Strengthened the institutional co-ordination through 
the Financial Services Regulation Coordination 
Committee (FSRCC). 
9) Adoption of a common accounting year end for all 
banks, aimed at improving data integrity and 
comparability. 
10) Conducting own risk assessments and relying less 
on rating agencies. 
11) Limited the tenor of Chief Executives/Directors of 
banks to 10 years and Non-Executive Directors to 
12 years. 
12) Limited the tenor of a bank‟s auditing firm to 10 
years. 
13) Implemented improved transparency in structured 
credit instruments for easy assessment of associated 
risks. 
Current Banking Reforms 2014 - 2018 
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 crises, there was 
heightened vigilance by both the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(NDIC) in banking system examination to detect possible 
signs of distress and resolution strategies. The Nigerian 
economy witnessed growth of 6.3 percent in the year 2014 
but that growth was sustained largely by the prevailing high 
oil prices in the international market. The year 2015, 
however, was a momentous year as crude oil prices declined 
massively. For instance, in January 2015, the price of crude 
oil in the international market was $46.59 per barrel, 
representing a year-on-year decline of 55.55 percent. It was 
also an election year for Nigeria thus huge government 
spending was imminent. The economy posted an average 
GDP growth of 3.05 percent for the first three quarters of 
2015. The weak performance was attributed to steeply 
declining oil prices; fall in investor confidence owing to 
delay in appointing a cabinet by the new Buhari-led 
government and the refusal to devalue the naira. Following 
the country-specific challenges faced by the oil sector even 
before oil price decline began (in June 2014) in the 
international oil market, the non-oil sector became the main 
growth driver of the Nigerian economy. The continuous 
decline in government revenue and shortage of foreign 
exchange to finance manufacturing businesses import 
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requirements led to significant slowdown in economic 
growth and redundancies in many firms with the attendant 
job losses. 
In response, the CBN deployed a vast range of policy 
interventions with the view to reducing foreign exchange 
demand and avoiding naira devaluation. The interventions 
included: 
1) The harmonization of cash reserve ratio (CRR) on 
public and private deposits to 31 percent.  
2) The outright ban on banks from accepting FX cash 
deposits from customers 
3) Restriction on accessing FX from the official 
market for 41 items. 
In spite of the measures put in place, the external reserves 
declined to USD$29.04 billion in December 2015 from a 
value of USD34.47 billion in the preceding year (15.75% 
decline). This outcome lent credence to the argument against 
CBN‟s continuous defense of the naira. Another factor in 
favour of naira devaluation was the wide gap that existed 
between the official rate of N197/dollar and the parallel 
market rate of N282/dollar in December 2015. Thus, it was 
generally believed that free market doctrine could be allowed 
to reign in order to resolve the FX shortage in the economy.  
The CBN had insisted on holding the official rate at 
N197/dollar since the naira was devalued from N168/dollar 
in February 2015. In sum, the CBN intervention in 2015 
included: 
1) Review of FX trading position for banks to 0.1% 
and back to 0.5% in January 2015 
2) Introduction, in February 2015, of incremental 
averaging for the computation of CRR on a 
fortnightly basis. 
3) CBN closed the RDAS window, conducted a 
special auction at the interbank forex market (at 
N197/dollar) resulting in a tacit devaluation of the 
naira in February 2015. 
4) Introduced trading curbs around the naira. 
5) In March, the implementation of the Treasury 
Single Account (TSA) commenced. It automated 
funds from Ministries, Departments and Agencies 
(MDAs) into a consolidated revenue fund (CRF). 
6) In April, the CBN released a circular to address the 
rising trend of currency substitution and reiterated 
that the Naira currency remains the only legal 
tender in Nigeria. Also, the CBN reviewed the limit 
on the usage of naira-denominated cards for 
international transactions from USD$150,000 to 
USD$50,000 per person per annum. 
7) CRR harmonization at 31 percent for both public 
and private sector deposits occurred in May. 
8) In June, the CBN banned 41 items from all Nigerian 
FX markets. It also extended the deadline for BVN 
registration from June 30th to October 31st 2015. 
9) In July, it instituted a limit of USD$300 
international daily ATM withdrawals. Cash-less 
policy was rolled out in the remaining 30 states of 
the federation. 
10)  In August, CBN suspended acceptance of FX cash 
deposits by deposit money banks. It also prohibited 
foreign currency lending to customers without 
foreign currency receivables.  
11) In September, the Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) reduced the CRR from 31 percent to 25 
percent. Also, in September, the deadline for the 
TSA remittance was observed to have witnessed 
partial compliance by banks. As at September 2015, 
the banking industry Non-performing loan ratio was 
estimated at 4.6 percent of all loans and advances. 
12) In October, the CBN permitted sale of FX for LCs 
approved before the exclusion circular of 41 items. 
Also, the CBN released a circular making BVN 
mandatory for all FX transactions. Further, there 
was inclusion of more items to the exclusion items 
labeled not valid for FX. 
13) In November, the MPC reduced the MPR from 13 
percent to 11 percent as well as a conditional 
decrease of CRR from 25 percent to 20 percent. 
Also, the CBN increased General Loan Loss 
Provision from 1 percent to 2 percent. 
14)  Mandating banks to brace up for the full 
implementation of Basel II which implies that only 
cash equities and fixed income securities would be 
eligible as qualifying mitigants.  
4. THE MANDATE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CBN 
The primary mandate of the CBN, as spelt out in the CBN 
Act of 2007, is to maintain price and exchange rate stability. 
Consequently all policies and programs of the central bank 
of Nigeria are in pursuance of this core mandate as per the 
initial CBN Act of 1958. There was no revision of CBN‟s 
mandate until 1990 following the deregulation exercise 
brought on by the Structural Adjustment Program SAP. The 
evolution of the financial landscape in Nigeria highlighted 
the need to strengthen the capacity of the central bank. 
Lending credence to the changes in the Nigerian Banking 
Industry, Ademola et al (2013) posit that SAP led to a 
proliferation of financial Institutions observing that “….at 
the beginning of the SAP reforms in 1986, there were a total 
of 29 commercial banks and 12 merchant banks…. by 1994, 
there were a total of 66 commercial banks and 54 merchant 
banks.” The emergence of many more banks was a wakeup 
call that the CBN was not „adequately mandated‟ to handle 
all aspects of banking in Nigeria. Noting increased 
competition and the deliberate „side-stepping‟ of prudent 
banking practice by banks, the regulatory authorities realized 
there was need for the CBN to adopt an enhanced regulatory 
framework (Ademola et al, 2013). This was the immediate 
cause for the enactment of the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Act (BOFIA) No. 24 and 25 of 1991 which 
among other things gave the CBN the power to vary or 
revoke a bank‟s license.  With time, there would be even 
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more amendments as evidenced by further revisions - 
1993,1997,1998,1999 and 2007 made to the Act of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. Through all these revisions, CBN‟s 
main policy thrust has revolved around its role as agent of 
monetary policy, maintenance of Nigeria‟s external reserves 
and provision of lender of last resort support for commercial 
banks needing urgent support in the face of insolvency 
(Olubisi, 2014). In addition, the CBN is expected to provide 
sound financial advice and generally serve as banker and 
financial adviser to both governments and banks. The list is 
by no means exhaustive of the current role of the CBN.  
With the successive bouts of bank distress and poor-
performance, the CBN has been blamed as being somewhat 
responsible albeit remotely for some of the triggers that 
destabilized the banking sector (Babalola, 2011). This 
explains why the CBN‟s mandate has been revised to 
improve in its capacity as apex banking institution. In line 
with the periodic mandate reviews, there have 
understandably been changes in its structure and operations 
with the most recent being in 2010.  
Presently the central bank has a Board of Directors being the 
highest decision body. This board is naturally chaired by the 
governor and has the deputy governors as members as well 
as non- executive members who are appointed by the federal 
government of Nigeria. The flow of authority is from the 
Board to the Governor who in turn has the five deputy 
Governors of the bank reporting to him. Each deputy 
governor mans a directorate. In all, there are 28 departments 
under the five directorates. The structure of the Central Bank 
is not entirely unique as the structure is in line with 
international best practices.  
5. THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE CBN 
The functions of the CBN can be categorized into three 
namely: Fundamental functions, regulatory role and 
developmental functions.  
The fundamental functions include the issuance of currency 
notes; banker and financial adviser to the government; 
bankers‟ bank; monetary policy authority for achievement of 
price stability and safeguarding the international value of the 
local currency naira; lender of last resort function; and other 
related functions. 
The regulatory functions include the control and supervision 
of the activities of deposit money banks and other non-bank 
financial institutions such as development banks, finance 
houses, discount houses and Bureaux de Change. These 
regulatory functions are typically carried out from the initial 
establishment through licensing to the monitoring of 
operations through issuance of prudential guidelines and a 
mix of both off- and on-site examination to monitor 
compliance to regulatory requirements. 
The development functions include mobilizing resources for 
economic development, for instance, through the issuance of 
government bonds/development stock and treasury securities 
to finance Federal government development plans; 
management of national debt; appealing to and incentivizing 
commercial banks on preferred sectors for credit allocation; 
encouraging money and capital markets development 
through the issuance of treasury bills and development stock; 
custodianship of the external reserves; and related functions.  
5.1 Performance Assessment of the CBN Vis-à-vis Its 
Mandate. 
Here, a quantitative analysis is attempted to appraise the 
monetary policy performance of the CBN in the promotion 
of price stability with respect to three indices namely: 
inflation, exchange rate stability and interest rate viability. 
The principal objectives of monetary policy are price 
stability, maintenance of a controlled inflation rate, exchange 
rate viability, full employment, sustained increase in output 
or economic growth and balance of payments equilibrium or 
viability. These objectives can be summed as economic 
stabilization (growth, price stability and full employment) 
and external balance (sustainable BOP and exchange rates).  
 
Inflation 
The Consumer Price Index CPI is the tool of choice for 
measuring inflation. It measures changes in the price of 
representative items that average Nigerians spend their 
money thereby assessing the annual percentage change in the 
living cost of an average consumer. Generated data for 
inflation analysis are computed averages not for end of 
period but rather for end of year. The CPI is an important 
variable which the CBN must pay attention to in keeping to 
its core mandate of ensuring price stability. 
Given the direct relationship between Money supply and 
Inflation, the principal strategy adopted by the CBN has been 
to deploy the Monetary Policy Rate MPR and Open Market 
Operation (OMO) more frequently than other tools. The 
former is used to control credit expansion while the latter is 
the tool of choice in mopping up excess liquidity.To boost 
investment, the CBN was largely expected to reduce the 
MPR thereby making it cheaper and more attractive for 
businesses to invest. The CBN has however chosen to 
maintain MPR at 14% throughout 2016 and 2017. And so 
while much of the developed world has maintained low(er) 
interest rates, the CBN has steadily increased the MPR over 
the years. Other monetary policy tools  like the CRR and 
Liquidity ratios have remained in place and remained fairly 
constant at 22.5% and 30% respectively. A contractionary 
monetary policy is the most accurate description of the 
inflation control techniques of the CBN.  The inflationary 
rates for the past 21 years are presented below: 
TABLE 5: Nigeria - Average consumer prices inflation 
rate 
YEAR INFLATION RATE (%) 
1996 29.3 
1997 10.7 
1998  7.9 
1999  6.6 
2000 6.9 
2001 18.9 
2002 12.9 
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2003 14.0 
2004 15.0 
2005 17.9 
2006 8.2 
2007 5.4 
2008 11.6 
2009 12.5 
2010 13.7 
2011 10.8 
2012 12.2 
2013 8.5 
2014 8.0 
2015 9.0 
2016 15.7 
2017 16.3 
SOURCE: https://knoema.com/atlas/Nigeria/Inflation-rate 
Available data shows that Nigeria‟s inflation rate has 
fluctuated over the years. Between 2013 and 2015, inflation 
rate remained consistently below 10%. CPI for 2016 and 
2017 was rather high with rates in the mid teens. The barrage 
of monetary policy tools deployed to combat inflation are 
several and so the inability to maintain a somewhat steady 
inflation rate below 10% for upwards of 5-10 years is 
worrisome and suggests that there is in fact room for 
improvement. 
There are some experts who argue and perhaps with good 
reason that the CBN‟s efforts in the monetary policy arena 
are counter productive and go so far to lay the blame for low 
or non existent economic growth squarely at the foot of the 
CBN(Boyo, 2017). A case in point is the handling of 
treasury bills. CBN‟s main strategy has been to use treasury 
bills and other instruments sold at the OMO to mop excess 
liquidity. Essentially what the CBN does in a bid to contain 
the volume of liquidity in the economy (being a known 
driver of headline inflation) is to “borrow and sterilize” 
funds the Deposit Money Banks would have deployed for 
their use and advantage. This action of keeping money 
supply in check is commendable. The problem lies however 
with the subsequent actions of the CBN who having 
withdrawn excess liquidity goes on to provide the same 
banks with liquidity through the standing lending facilities 
made available by the apex bank. The withdrawal via the 
sale of treasury bills denied DMBs much needed funds and 
this explains the constant liquidity drained position of banks. 
A cursory analysis clearly shows a persistent increase in 
bank requests for lending from the Standing Lending 
Facilities made available by the Central Bank (Boyo, 2017). 
For example, in the week starting December 11th 2017, 
DMBs borrowed N671bn. This seemingly high amount of 
borrowing was less than the 1.019tn borrowed by DMBs the 
previous week (starting 4th December). Experts believe the 
higher borrowing from the Central Bank is directly 
attributable to liquidity scarcity. Expectedly, banks (with 
bigger liquidity challenges) are seen to frequent the SLF 
window more than others. (Abioye, 2017). 
In agreement that not all CBN policies are well received, 
Boyo (2017) points out: 
“….in 2016, for example, the 
federal budget was about N6tn, 
but the CBN, simultaneously also, 
embarked on borrowing about 
N6Tn in the same year, to remove 
perceived excess funds, primarily 
held by banks, to curtail liberal 
consumer demand and hold back 
inflation. Furthermore, despite the 
misguided hope of Nigerians, that 
the bigger N7.298Tn 2017 budget 
will improve economic welfare, 
the CBN, may have also, 
simultaneously borrowed over 
N7Tn before December 31st 
2017, ostensibly to reduce excess 
money supply to restrain 
inflation. Consequently, If CBN‟s 
strategy for restraining the 
inflationary impact of systemic 
excess money supply, correlates 
with tradition, then the N8.6Tn 
proposed in the 2018 budget will, 
invariably also attract additional 
easy money to the banks, from the 
interest payments probably in 
excess of N700bn they will 
charge on Treasury bills that CBN 
would compulsively auction to 
reduce money supply and halt the 
threat of inflation spiraling out of 
control”. 
Boyo (2017) maintains that CBN‟s strategies are self 
harming, reckless, counterproductive and may instigate 
systemic excess money supply. Supporting Boyo‟s position, 
Salami (as cited by Abioye, 2017) questions CBN‟s rationale 
for acting the way it has. Salami observes the sharp increase 
in the lending to Government noting that “CBN‟s claims on 
the government had risen “20-fold” to N814bn from the end 
of 2016, while its purchases of government treasury bills 
increased by 30 per cent to N454bn.” Salami cautions that 
the CBN is essentially providing the federal government 
with „piggy-bank services‟. 
 All this withdrawing via treasury bills and then support for 
banks through the SLF to enable them adjust their liquidity 
positions appropriately while simultaneously providing the 
federal Government‟s funding needs suggests that the CBN 
might need, going forward a re-strategized plan. Summarily, 
the CBN does have its work cut out for it. How does the 
CBN achieve price stability while fostering a conducive 
business environment? What is the best way to „contain‟ 
inflation without harming the producing units in the 
economy?  
Interest rates 
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It is impossible to discuss CBN‟s strategy for inflation 
control without the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR). This is 
because the MPR is the rate at which the CBN lends to 
banks- it is the rate at which the CBN rediscounts all first 
class bills and hence has the singular effect of affecting the 
determination of all other interest charges by banks and 
financial institutions. Simply put, it is the benchmark interest 
rate in Nigeria. An increase in the MPR will expectedly lead 
to an increase in interest charged by banks. Would-be 
borrowers are often deterred by higher interest rates. 
Conversely a decrease would automatically signal borrowers 
to take advantage of the decreased rates and thus encourage 
more people to borrow.  
Now, informed rational savers keep an eye simultaneously 
on interest rates and Treasury bill rates. During periods of 
monetary policy tightening, the Central Bank seeks to reduce 
money in circulation and so in addition to a hike in interest 
rates; there is often an accompanying sale of treasury bills. 
The sale of treasury bills enables the CBN to „withdraw‟ 
funds that would have increased money supply by effectively 
sterilizing and making it impossible for DMBs to utilize such 
funds as they would have preferred. So in periods of 
tightening, the CBN ensures that the Treasury bill rates are 
higher. Savers knowing that there is more to be gained from 
buying treasury bills would choose to buy them rather than 
earn the lower interest banks offer. On the other hand, when 
government seeks to expand money supply, the CBN (in its 
capacity as agent of monetary policy) would adjust the MPR 
to be lower than interest rates-the result is that more people 
are encouraged to keep their funds in banks. Of course we all 
know that going by the economic maxim that S savings =I 
investment, all saved funds are automatically invested as 
they become loans to business firms. Summarily, one can 
say that there exists a most interesting relationship between 
the interest rates, Treasury bill rates and the overall health of 
the economy. And who could be better placed than the CBN 
to measure the pulse of the economy and subsequently 
determine which policy tool might work best?  
To this end, the CBN has continued to keep its eye on the 
ball. The table below presents the MPR and Treasury bill 
rates from 2006. Indeed the relationship between interest 
rates and Treasury Bill Rates is an interesting one. These 
rates are computed and presented monthly. For ease in 
presentation, we only provide the rates for January and July 
for the period 2006 to 2017. We believe that the relationship 
between these two variables can still be inferred. 
Table 6: Monetary policy Rates Vs Treasury Bill Rates 
(2006-2017) 
PERIOD MPR (%) TBR(%) 
01-01-2006 13 13.68 
01-07-2006 14 9.79 
01-01-2007 10 7.10 
01-07-2007 8 5.98 
01-01-2008 9.50 8.58 
01-07-2008 10.25 9.21 
01-01-2009 9.75 3.88 
01-07-2009 6 3.93 
01-01-2010 6 3.72 
01-07-2010 6 2.94 
01-01-2011 6.5 7.49 
01-07-2011 8.75 7.08 
01-01-2012 12 14.85 
01-07-2012 12 13.86 
01-01-2013 12 11.17 
01-07-2013 12 11.56 
01-01-2014 12 10.81 
01-07-2014 12 9.88 
01-01-2015 13 11.2 
01-07-2015 13 10 
01-01-2016 11 4.12 
01-07-2016 14 12.34 
01-01-2017 14 13.95 
01-07-2017 14 13.46 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA 
(https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/mnymktind.asp) 
From the table above, we see a gradual and consistent 
increase in interest rates starting from 2011. Treasury bill 
rates are not as consistent as interest rates in this same 
period. From the first quarter of 2009, interest rates drop. 
This period coincides with the global recession witnessed 
and it is understandable that the CBN keeps interest rates 
lower so as to boost the economy and encourage businesses 
to seek loans. The interest rates as well as the Treasury bill 
rates are at their respective lowest levels in the period under 
study here (2006-2017).  
Exchange Rate Stability 
In seeking to maintain price stability, the central bank has to 
preserve the relative value of the Naira while going further to 
ensure that the country maintains an external reserve position 
that is not „in the red‟. Unfortunately like every other market 
across the globe, the foreign exchange market is volatile and 
responds to the whims and caprices of supply-demand 
dynamics. And so there is need for the central bank to 
remain pro active if it is to remain in control when dealing 
with the market fundamentals unique to the foreign exchange 
market.  It is of utmost importance that the country‟s internal 
balance as well as macroeconomic stability is not 
compromised by the nation‟s foreign exchange policy.   Over 
the years, the CBN has adopted several mechanisms in its 
bid to achieve relative stability of the exchange rate. Initially 
a fixed exchange rate regime was used until it became 
apparent that fixity was not sustainable.  
The CBN understanding that non availability of foreign 
exchange would naturally push prices higher thereby 
reducing the value of the naira has become quite responsive 
to the foreign exchange market showing a readiness to do all 
that is necessary to keep the naira stable. The CBN has 
continued to change its position to reflect the realities of the 
market. To this end, CBN‟s increased responsiveness has 
resulted in the following: 
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1. The removal of restrictions on foreign exchange 
purchases by widening the scope of transactions 
that can be funded by official foreign exchange 
2. Before June 2018, the 2 major operators 
(commercial banks and Bureau de Changes (BDCs) 
had different prices. The commercial banks were 
able to buy at slightly lower prices. The BDCs 
kicked against this and insisted on a level playing 
ground if the naira was going to remain stable. The 
difference in price is believed to further fuel 
competition between banks and the BDCs as well as 
increased speculative tendencies among major 
dealers.  
3. Banks are now mandated to make foreign exchange 
available over the counter to both customers and 
non customers 
In summary, the demand for foreign exchange remains high 
and appears among other things to be driven by high demand 
for dollars during travel season, rising foreign exchange 
demand to fund retail end purchases, rising naira liquidity 
and the demand of foreign exchange to pay school fees. All 
these pose a serious challenge to foreign exchange stability. 
The current market structure of a floated exchange rate has 
indeed helped to ease the volatility of the market as the 
current price appears to be to a large extent the product of 
demand and supply and not the previous era where the price 
of foreign exchange was arbitrarily fixed by the CBN.  
Indeed the principal objective of exchange rate management 
has always been to make the naira firmer against other 
currencies. Speculation, hoarding, illegal cash border 
transfers and rent seeking are some activities that undermine 
the efforts of the CBN. To counter these, the CBN must 
remain at the top of its game and remain highly sensitive to 
foreign exchange operations. 
A major challenge expected as Nigeria heads in to the 
election season, is how politicians will influence the demand 
for foreign exchange having seen from the 2011 and 2015 
general elections that the dollar appears to be the currency of 
choice. The CBN must therefore ensure exchange rate 
stability by not allowing the demand for foreign exchange 
outrun supply.  
6. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we set out to provide an exploratory review of 
the development of central banking in Nigeria, the 
operations of the apex bank as well as projecting what the 
future may hold.  
First, a review of the West African Currency Board system 
was done in order to appreciate the forces leading to 
transition to central banking in Nigeria. The WACB, branded 
as a money changer, had as its main function that of the 
abolition of awkward native exchange standards and 
replacing them with the more convenient British standards 
represented by the WACB‟s pound, shilling and pence. The 
West African pound currency note, which was the common 
currency for the British West African colonies exchanged at 
par with the British pound at the rate of 1:1 throughout the 
period 1912 to 1959 following the establishment of the CBN. 
Second, despite the amendments to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) Act over the decades of its existence, 
monetary policy has always met with challenges in different 
stages of economic development.  
Third, in order to meet the objectives of price stability and 
sound and stable financial system, the CBN does not operate 
a single intervention tool but rather a combination of policy 
instruments including price-based, quantity-based and 
administrative policy measures.  
Fourth, the CBN has been promoting financial reforms and 
playing a key role of regulation during various episodes 
which may further strengthen the financial system and 
contribute to economic growth and help balance growth in 
different economic sectors. 
Going forward, the CBN must maintain its pro active stance.  
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